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UNITED STATES LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER
THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
[Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635
(8th Cir. 1985)]
INTRODUCTION
Government resources and expertise can have a substantial chil-
ling effect on an individual challenging unreasonable government ac-
tion.' In a suit against the United States, a private party is
economically weak by comparison, and is made more feeble by a
deprivation of constitutional rights.2 This helplessness is magnified
by the government's inherent power and image of invulnerability.
Vindication of constitutional rights depends heavily on private en-
forcement.3 Attorneys' fees, however, often prove to be a formida-
ble, if not insurmountable, obstacle to private challenges.4
Consequently, fee awards are an essential remedy if private citizens
are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights.
Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act5 (EAJA) in order
to reduce the disparity of resources between the government and in-
dividuals challenging the United States.6 Section 2412(b) of the
EAJA provides that the United States shall be liable for fee awards to
1. Note, Civil Procedure-Attorney's Fees-Recovery of Attorney's Fees Against the United
States-The EqualAccess toJustice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980), 10 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 723, 726 (1983).
2. Smith v. Puett, 506 F. Supp. 134, 146 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (failure to award
fees frustrates the policy of § 1988).
3. In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
Justice White portrayed the importance of providing individuals with the means to
vindicate fundamental constitutional rights:
And, if any statutory policy is deemed so important that its enforcement
must be encouraged by awards of attorneys' fees, how could a court deny
attorneys' fees to private litigants in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking
to vindicate constitutional rights?
Id. at 264.
4. There are three categories of expenditures associated with pursuing a claim
in a judicial proceeding: expenses, attorneys' fees, and taxable costs. The Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act treats these categories as separate and distinct, creating different
standards for each. The scope of this Comment is limited to attorneys' fees. For an
expanded discussion, see generally Hughes, Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1983, at 1.
5. Equal Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504; 25 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
6. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4984, 4984.
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the same extent that any other party would be liable.7 Failure to
charge the United States with attorneys' fees where state government
would be liable under virtually identical circumstances frustrates the
purpose of the EAJA.8
In Premachandra v. Mitts,9 however, the Eighth Circuit held that
notwithstanding the EAJA, the United States is not liable for fee
awards to the same extent as state governments.' 0 Premachandra,
successful in a civil rights action against the United States, sought
recovery of attorneys' fees. Such recovery of fees is permitted in vir-
tually identical cases involving deprivation of rights under color of
state law.I The issue in Premachandra was whether section 2412(b)
of the United States Code permits fee awards in analogous suits in-
volving deprivation of rights under color of federal law.12 The
Eighth Circuit held that the United States can not be charged with
attorneys' fees under section 2412(b) in a suit based on a constitu-
tional violation. 13
The Eighth Circuit found no basis in the statutes or their legisla-
tive history to support an award of attorneys' fees. 14 The court
stated that an expansive reading of section 2412(b) would upset the
balance of the EAJA. 15 The court also found that Congress failed to
use specific language to impose liability on the United States for fees
in constitutional deprivation actions.16 Accordingly, the Eighth Cir-
cuit resolved, in the government's favor the uncertainty that shrouds
the statute.' 7
The Eighth Circuit in Premachandra resorted to a strict reading of
section 2412(b) that ignores the clear intent of Congress and shelters
the United States. Section 2412(b) imposes liability on the United
States to the same extent as any other party. State governments are
held accountable for constitutional violations by statute. Whereas
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
8. Smith, 506 F. Supp. at 146 (cause of action brought under § 1983).
9. 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
10. Id. at 641-42.
11. Id. at 643 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 638.
13. Id. at 641.
14. Id. at 636.
15. Id. at 636-37. Accord Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 1984)
(balance struck by Congress would be upset if § 2412(b) were interpreted to allow
awards in analogous suits to § 1983).
16. The Eighth Circuit stated that "Congress could have clearly made the United
States liable for fees in constitutional deprivation actions but chose not to do so. A
concise amendment to section 2414(b) or a modification of section 1988 could have
accomplished this purpose. Failure to take these specific steps casts doubt on
whether Congress intended the result urged by Premachandra." Premachandra, 753
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EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
the United States is held accountable under common law. The
Premachandra court held that the United States does not violate the
Constitution the same as "any other party" since it acts under color
of federal law. Thus, the United States was not liable for Premachan-
dra's attorneys' fees.
The significance of Premachandra is that the United States is still not
on a par with other defendants in terms of liability for attorneys'
fees. Litigants whose constitutional rights are violated by the federal
government must meet a higher standard to recover fees.18 This im-
munity will continue to hinder the enforcement of important societal
rights.
This Comment employs Premachandra as a vehicle for discussion of
the recovery of attorneys' fees under section 2412(b) in constitu-
tional deprivation actions. First, the Comment will examine the
common law of the American Rule 22 and sovereign immunity. Sec-
ond, sovereign immunity and the various statutes that affect fee shift-
ing will be examined. Finally, the Premachandra case will be analyzed
in depth.
I. HISTORY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
Generally, prevailing litigants in the United States are not entitled
to collect their attorneys' fees from the losing party. 19 Congress has
complemented common law exceptions to this rule with fee shifting
statutes to encourage private enforcement of important societal
goals.20 The United States, however, has historically been immune
from the taxing of attorneys' fees, even under fee shifting statutes.2 '
This doctrine of sovereign immunity has currently fallen into disfa-
vor as the courts and the legislatures carve out exceptions. 2 2
18. See id.
19. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 128-31 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
717-18 (1967); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 792, 793 (1966) (American rule is more restrictive than the general rule that
prevails in other nations); Kuenzel, The Attorneys Fees: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49
IOWA L. REV. 75, 78 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as
an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 623 (1931); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees In-
cluded in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 202, 204 (1966) (calling for
liberalization of American Rule); Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mill v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 317-23 (1971); Note, Attorney's Fees:
Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1217 (1967).
20. Alyeska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at 263 (Congress has opted to rely heavily on
private enforcement to implement public policy by providing fee awards).
21. Id. at 267-68 n.42 (well known that a sovereign is not liable unless specific
provision for such liability is made by law); NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 517
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980) (sovereign immunity is a formidable
barrier to recovery from United States).
22. Taylor v. NewJersey Highway Auth., 126 A.2d 313, 319 (N.J. 1956) (hostility
1986]
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A. Common Law Background
1. The American Rule v. English Rule
It is well established in American common law that each party in
litigation bears his own attorneys' fees regardless of the merits of the
case.23 This doctrine, known as the "American Rule" is the antithe-
sis of the "English Rule" which grants fees to prevailing parties.24
The premise of the American Rule is grounded in the belief that a
losing party should not be penalized for merely exercising his right
to defend or prosecute a lawsuit.25
The federal judiciary has carved out two common law exceptions
to the American Rule: specifically, the "bad faith" exception 26 and
the "common benefit" rule.27 Under the bad faith exception, fees
toward sovereign immunity is evidenced in the states); see Ehrenzweig, supra note 19,
at 792-93.
23. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at 247-62 (reviewing common law
and legislative developments creating exceptions to the general rule that a litigant
may not recover attorneys' fees from the United States); Fleischmann Distilling Corp.,
386 U.S. at 717-18 (discussing historical changes in recovery of attorneys' fees).
24. See generally Avery, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by Government Contractors and
Grantees, 16 NAT'L Cor. MGMT. J. 25, 25 n.3 (1982); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J.
849 (1929).
In a brief review of the historical background of awards of attorneys' fees, the
Supreme Court stated the following:
As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel
fees to successful plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts
have been empowered to award counsel fees to defendants in all actions
where such awards might be made to plaintiffs. Rules governing administra-
tion of these and related provisions have developed over the years. It is now
customary in England, after litigation of substantive claims has terminated,
to conduct separate hearings before special "taxing Masters" in order to
determine the appropriateness and the size of an award of counsel fees. To
prevent the ancillary proceedings from becoming unduly protracted and
burdensome, fees which may be included in an award are usually prescribed,
even including the amounts that may be recovered for letters drafted on
behalf of a client.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 717 (citations omitted).
25. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718 (the poor might be unjustly dis-
couraged from vindicating their rights if the penalty for losing included their oppo-
nent's fees); see Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964). "Thus,
one of the . . . purposes of the American Rule is not to discourage or deter litiga-
tion." See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4988.
26. F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 126-31 (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962)) (attorneys' fees assessed as a sanction); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale
Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923) (fees assessed against a party who willfully dis-
obeyed a court order).
27. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 481-82 (1980) (application of
common-fund doctrine for a violation of federal securities law); Mills v. Electric Auto
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-93 (1970) (extended common benefit theory to include
nonmonetary benefits as a basis for award in stockholder's derivative suit); Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939) (permitting equitable award of at-
[Vol. 12
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may be assessed against a party who "has acted in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason." 28 The common benefit
exception is established when a litigant has, by virtue of winning his
suit, conferred a "common benefit" on a group of people in addition
to himself.2 9 Under the common benefit exception the successful lit-
igant may recover fees from the beneficiaries.SO
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,31 the United States
cannot be charged with attorneys' fees absent express statutory
waiver of its immunity.32 Thus, the common law exceptions to the
American Rule do not apply to actions involving the United States as
torneys' fees and costs from the proceeds of bond sales); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Montana
Comm'r of Labor and Indus., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982) (common benefit
exception applies when the court can accurately shift the litigant's expenses to those
who benefited from them; amicus curaie not entitled to award of attorneys' fees
under common benefit exception).
The common benefit exception is also known as the "equitable trust" or "com-
mon fund" exception. Hughes, supra note 4, at 3. For an excellent discussion of the
common fund exception, see Comment, Attorney Fees: Slipping from the American Rule
StraightJacket, 40 MONT. L. REV. 308, 309-12 (1979).
Attorneys' fees have also been awarded pursuant to contractual provision. Equi-
table Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 521-24, 334 N.E.2d 391,
396-97, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 463-65 (1976); see Venus v. Goodman, 556 F. Supp. 514,
520 n.10 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (equitable power to permit a party that preserves a fund
for others to collect fees).
28. Hall, 412 U.S. at 5 (underlying rationale is punitive, and an essential element
is the existence of bad faith); see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S.
400, 402 n.4 (1968); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Bell v.
School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1951). The bad faith
exception may be invoked against a party that has willfully disobeyed an order of the
court. Toledo Scale Co., 261 U.S. at 426-28.
29. F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 130-31; Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718-
19; accord Lipsig v. National Student Mrktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (per curiam); cf. Universal Oil Prods Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575,
580 (1946).
The "common benefit" exception may be applied to two types of situations.
First, the party may preserve a non-pecuniary benefit for a group or class (common
benefit). Second, the party may create a fund or preserve a fund of money or assets
for the benefit of a group or class (common fund). Dods & Kennedy, The Equal Access
to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. REV. 48, 59 (1981).
30. Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 480-81; Mills, 396 U.S. at 392-97 (petitioners awarded
attorneys' fees since expenses were incurred for the benefit of the corporation); see
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
31. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in ancient common law.
The doctrine is based on the tenet that the king can do no wrong. A present policy
reason for retaining this immunity is the protection of the state from interference
with state funds, property, and instrumentalities. Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y.
436, 439, 131 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1956).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a); see Alyeska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at 267-68; Spencer, 712
F.2d at 545; Fenton v. Federal Ins. Adm'r, 633 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1981);
E.E.O.C. v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1,620 F.2d 1220, 1227 (7th Cir. 1980).
1986]
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a litigant.33 Moreover, even fee shifting statutes are not applicable
to the United States unless the statute expressly includes federal par-
ties.3 4 The immunity of the United States is absolute and unqualified
absent consent to suit.s5 Accordingly, statutes waiving sovereign im-
munity are narrowly construed so as not to imply liability where it
has not been expressly and clearly imposed by Congress. 36
2. Assault of the American Rule
The restrictive American Rule has been the subject of persistent
attack by both the courts and the legislature.37 Congress relies heav-
ily on private litigation to implement policy and enforce important
personal rights.38 Congress has made specific provisions for the al-
lowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes granting or pro-
tecting various federal rights.3 9
33. See, e.g., Pealo v. Farmers Home Admin., 562 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(rejecting common benefit exception): Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. GSA, 561
F.2d 397, 405 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing to apply bad faith exception).
34. See, e.g., NAACP, 609 F.2d at 516-17 (waiver cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed); Shannon v. HUD, 577 F.2d 854, 856 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1002 (1978).
35. Shannon, 577 F.2d at 855-56 (attorneys' fees may not be awarded without
express statutory authority); see Alyeska Phpeline Co., 421 U.S. at 265-68; Fitzgerald v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm., 554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Richerson
v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 925 (3rd Cir. 1977) (denying award of interest on claim
against United States).
36. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983); NAACP, 609 F.2d at 516-
17; Shannon, 577 F.2d at 855-56; Monark Boat Co. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1322, 1326-27
(8th Cir. 1983).
37. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at 792; Goodhart, supra note 24, at
849; Mause, Winner Takes Al: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REV.
26 (1969); Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 202; Note, Attorney's Fees, 43 Miss. L.J. 238
(1972); Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 313 (1941);
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
636, 648-55 (1974); Note, supra note 19, at 1216; Note, Distribution of Legal Expense
Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940).
38. See, e.g., Alveska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at 263; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251, 265-66 (1972) (fee shifting in connection with treble-damages awards
under the antitrust laws); Newman, 390 U.S. at 402 (1968) (fee shifting unwarranted
because Civil Rights Act is intended to encourage individuals injured by racial dis-
crimination to seek relief).
39. There are numerous statutory exceptions to the American Rule. See, e.g.,
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 309, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1982); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, § 323, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(E) (1982); Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 7(e), 29 U.S.C. § 107(E)
(1982); Fair Labor Standards Act, § 16(B), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982); Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 28, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1982); Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. II, § 204(b), 78 Stat., 244, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b); Fair Housing Act
of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12(d), 42
U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1982).
[Vol. 12
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss4/4
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
In the 1960's and early 1970's, courts began to experiment with
more liberal fee shifting rules, the most notable being the private
attorney general concept.40 This doctrine provided attorneys' fees
to successful litigants vindicating rights deemed to be important to
the public.4 1 Parties were permitted to recover fees as private attor-
neys general when their suit resulted in the enforcement of "impor-
tant societal rights."49
The Supreme Court halted this judicially-managed doctrine in the
case of Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.43 The Wilder-
ness Society, an environmental group, had been successful in the un-
derlying action to enjoin the construction of a pipeline.44 The lower
court awarded attorneys' fees to the society because it was perform-
ing the services of a private attorney general.45 The Supreme Court
held that in the absence of statutory authority, courts could not ex-
40. See Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to Judgment Act, I 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 307, 309-10; Comment, supra note 37, at 657, 666-70. The doctrine
of sovereign immunity and former 28 U.S.C. § 2412 continued to bar recovery
against the United States under this theory. Id. at 679. In these circumstances, how-
ever, litigants often joined and fees recovered from private litigants. Id.
41. Comment, supra note 37, at 666-70.
42. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Perini,
503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974);
Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoitt v. Vitek,
495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir.
1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 955 (1973); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Knight v.
Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
143 (5th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to adopt the private
attorney general rule. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (4th Cir. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). But cf. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 497 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 1974)
(affirming district court decision in a § 1983 action where attorneys' fees were not
awarded because the defendant's conduct could not be characterized as "unreasona-
ble obdurate obstinancy" as per the Strolberg v. Trustees for the State Colleges of Connecticut
test).
43. Alyeska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at 240. Although the Supreme Court had sum-
marily affirmed the award of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doc-
trine in Sims v. Amos, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), the Alyeska Pipeline Co. pointed out that
Sims involved state officials and an eleventh amendment defense. Cf Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment is a bar to monetary award
against state parties).
The private attorney general concept has been drawing criticism in recent years.
See, e.g., McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972).
44. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421
U.S. 240 (1975); see Comment, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 337 (1973).
45. Wilderness Socyv, 479 F.2d at 849.
1986]
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ceed the common law limits of the American Rule.46
B. Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act & Civil Action
or Deprivation of Rights
Just one year after Alyeska, Congress responded by enacting the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act of 1976, which is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1988.4 7 Congress, realizing that private individuals must
sue to enforce their civil rights, provided the necessary attorneys'
fees.48 Section 1988, a fee shifting statute, provides reasonable at-
torneys' fees to the prevailing party in any action or proceeding to
enforce enumerated civil rights acts. 49 Although fee awards under
section 1988 are discretionary, a prevailing party should be awarded
fees unless special circumstances render the award unjust.50
One of the substantive statutes enumerated in section 1988 is 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 establishes a civil cause of action for
the deprivation of federal constitutional rights.51 Section 1983 es-
tablishes a cause of action to any person who under color of state law
has been subject to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
46. Alyeska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at 267-71.
47. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 205cc, 94 Stat. 2630 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
NAACP, 609 F.2d at 518 (§ 1988 passed in response to Alyeska); see Spencer, 712 F.2d
at 544.
48. Smith, 506 F. Supp. at 145-46 (well-established that prevailing party in § 1983
action is entitled to attorneys' fees).
49. Section 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985 and 1986 or this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [42 U.S.C.
2000d et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et
seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id.
50. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Teitelbaum v.
Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1249 (9th Cir. 1981); Collins v. Chandler Unified School
Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); Riddell v. Na-
tional Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980); Sethy v. Alameda County
Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (citing legislative history
of § 1988), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); see also Alyeska Pipeline Co., 421 U.S. at
262; Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis Schools, 412 U.S. 427 (1973);
Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
51. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivaiton of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[Vol. 12
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss4/4
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
munities secured by federal law or the Constitution. 52
C. Equal Access to Justice Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the award of fees against
the United States in the absence of express statutory authorization.53
The EAJA was enacted to diminish the economic deterrent to chal-
lenges of government actions.54 Intended to put the United States
on a par with other litigants,55 the EAJA substantially broadens the
liability of the United States for fees in a wide variety of circum-
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., NAACP, 609 F.2d at 521 (denying attorneys' fees against United
States).
EAJA became effective October 1, 1981. The EAJA provides that a party prevail-
ing against the federal government may be awarded fees: "The United States shall be
liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides
for such an award." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (emphasis added). Congress recognized
that individuals who could not afford the high costs of litigation were precluded from
vindicating important personal rights. "[T]he costs of securing vindication of their
rights and the inability to recover attorney fees preclude resort to the adjudicatory
process." H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4988.
54. Goldhaber v. Foley, 698 F.2d 193, 197 (3rd Cir. 1983); Wolverton v.
Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 422 (D. Idaho 1982); Ellis v. United States, 550 F.
Supp. 674, 676 (Ct. Cl. 1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4984.
The "Findings and Purpose" of EAJA are stated in the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (repealed 1980).
(a) The Congress finds that certain individuals, partnerships, corpora-
tions, and labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking re-
view of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of
the expense involved in securing the vindicaton of their rights in civil ac-
tions and in administrative proceedings.
(b) The Congress further finds that because of the greater resources
and expertise of the United States the standard for an award of fees against
the United States should be different from the standard governing an award
against a private litigant, in certain situations.
(c) It is the purpose of this title-
(1) to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending
against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an
award of attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other costs against the
United States; and
(2) to insure the applicability in actions by or against the United States
of the common law and statutory exceptions to the "American rule"
respecting the award of attorney fees.
Id.
The EAJA was enacted in response to the Alyeska Court's invitation. Spencer, 712 F.2d
at 544-45.
55. Section 2412 was aimed at removing the federal government's unfair advan-
tage. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 563 (quoting House Report at 9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4987).
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stances. 56 The United States is now subject to statutory as well as
common law exceptions to the American Rule.5
7
Although the EAJA retains a general provision barring awards of
attorneys' feesS8 against the Unted States, sections 2412(b) and
2412(d) provide broad exceptions.59 Section 2412(b), a discretion-
ary subsection, provides that the United States is liable to the same
extent that other parties are liable under fee shifting statutes or com-
mon law exceptions to the American Rule. 60
56. Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1224 (EAJA substantially broadens the liability of
the United States); Spencer, 712 F.2d at 545 (EAJA applies to all civil actions involving
United States and allows attorneys' fees in wide variety of circumstances). There
have been conflicting and confusing judicial interpretations of section 2412(d). Con-
gress left most of section 2412(d)'s terms undefined. See generally Wheeler & Lavan,
The Equal Access to Justice Act: The "American Rule" Revisited, 15 PUB. CorNr. L.J. 60
(1984).
57. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 120; 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 3659, at 186 (1985). Hughes, supra note 4, at 6.
58. Prior to adoption of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 barred awards of attorneys'
fees against the United States absent express statutory authority to the contrary.
Shannon, 577 F.2d at 855-56; Bush v. Bays, 463 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Va. 1978);
Prior to amendment, § 2412(a) provided in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and
expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action
brought by or against the United States or any agency and any official of the
United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having juris-
diction of such action.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (emphasis added).
59. Prior to amendment, § 2412 was consistently construed as immunizing the
United States against attorneys' fees awards absent clear or express statutory author-
ity to the contrary. NAACP, 609 F.2d at 516.
Although § 2412(d) expired October 1, 1984, under a sunset clause, this provi-
sion continues to apply through final disposition of any action commenced before
that date. President Reagan declined to sign H.R. 5479, the reenactment of § 504
and § 2412(d) of EAJA with modifications. Memorandum of Disapproval, Office of
the Press Secretary (Santa Barbara, California), November 9, 1984. Reagan pledged
to make the retroactive enactment of the Act a high legislative priority of the next
Congress. Id. at 1. Reagan withheld approval of the bill because of changes which
expanded the scope of the attorneys' fees provision to apply to underlying agency
actions. Id.
60. Section 2412(b) provides:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees
and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded
pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought
by or against the United States or any agency and any official of the United
States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of
such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to
the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law
or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an
award.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
Congress, through enactment of subsection (b) of § 2412, sought to make the
common law exceptions to the American Rule applicable to the United States. Lounit-
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The second exception of the EAJA, section 2412(d), was an experi-
mental, but mandatory exception to the American Rule.61 Section
2412(d) provided that a court shall award attorneys' fees to a party
who prevails over the United States, unless the position of the
United States is substantially justified or special circumstances make
the award unjust.6 2 This subsection shifts fees in most situations
where an award is not authorized under common law or by a specific
statute. 63 The standard of section 2412(d) is more difficult to satisfy
than section 2412(b), since the government can escape subsection
(d) liability by showing that its position was "substantially
justified."64
1. Prevailing Parties
A party must be "prevailing" in the underlying action to qualify
for an award under any fee shifting statute. Although the EAJA does
not define "prevailing party," its legislative history indicates that the
term is to be read consistently with its use in other fee shifting stat-
utes. 65 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that similar attor-
zen, 736 F.2d at 554; see H.R. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4953, 5003, 5014 ("[This subsection] reflects the be-
lief that, at a minimum, the United States should be held to the same standards in
litigating as private parties."); H.R. REP. No. 1418 art. 9, 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4987, 4996; see also Spencer, 712 F.2d at 545.
61. Section 2412(d)(1)(A) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in
addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that
party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) brought by or
against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, un-
less the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
Although the experimental period of this provision has currently expired, it is
expected that it will be re-encacted with modifications. See generally Breger, Don't Open
a Pandora's Box!, 71 A.B.A. J. 40 (1985) (rebuilding EAJA); Crassley, How Should the
Equal Access to Justice Act be Rebuilt ?: Congress Wants a Wide Reaching EAJA, 71 A.B.A. J.
40 (1985); Freeman, Attorney's Fees and Costs in § 1983 Actions Under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988, and Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 56
OKLA. B.J. 1746, 1751 (1985); Middleton, Congress to Try Again on EAJA? Bill Vetoed by
President Reagan, 7 NAT'L L.J. 3 (1984).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
63. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th
Cir. 1984) (in determining whether the government's position was "substantially jus-
tified," the court must evaluate the position under a "reasonableness" test). The
standard "substantially justified" was adopted from rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides for sanctions against parties who abuse the discovery
process. See Note, Will the Sun Rise Again for the Equal Access to Justice Act?, 48 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 265, 290-95 (1982).
65. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
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neys' fee provisions should be interpreted pan passu.66
A litigant may be a "prevailing party" without having obtained a
final judgment after a full trial on the merits. 6 7 Thus, parties may be
considered to have prevailed without formally obtaining relief when
their rights are vindicated through a consentjudgment.68 Moreover,
courts have allowed a litigant to be defined as a "prevailing party"
and eligible for attorneys' fees when subsequent remedial action by a
defendant effectively moots the controversy after the initiation of a
lawsuit.69 Indeed, a prevailing party need not succeed on every the-
ory. 70 A plaintiff who succeeds on any significant issue which
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4990; see also NLRB v. Doral Bldg. Serv., Inc., 680 F.2d 647,
647 (9th Cir. 1982) (for purpose of defining term "prevailing party," EAJA and 42
U.S.C. § 1988 are indistinguishable).
The EAJA provides:
Under existing fee-shifting statutes, the definition of prevailing party
has been the subject of litigation. It is the committee's intention that the
interpretation of the term in S. 265 be consistent with the law that has devel-
oped under existing statutes. Thus, the phrase "prevailing party" should
not be limited to a victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full
trial on the merits. A party may be deemed prevailing if he obtains a
favorable settlement of his case; if the plaintiff has sought a voluntary dis-
missal of a groundless complaint; or even if he does not ultimately prevail
on all issues.
H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4990 (citations omitted).
66. Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428. Pari passu means by an "equal progress, without
preference." 5 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1004 (5th ed. 1979).
67. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-
1558 (1976)); see also United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 808-09
(5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (1 1th Cir. 1982);
United States ex rel. Heydt v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1982);
Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 462-63, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981) (test is
whether plaintiff essentially succeeds in obtaining the relief he seeks).
68. 329.73 Acres, 704 F.2d at 808-09; Busbee, 684 F.2d at 1379; Citizens State Bank,
668 F.2d at 447.
The legislative history of the EAJA states: "The phrase prevailing party should
not be limited to a victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on
the merits. A party may be deemed prevailing if he obtains a favorable settlement of
his case."
69. Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264, 266 (7th Cir. 1981); United Handi-
capped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 346-48 (8th Cir. 1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
581 F.2d 275, 279-80 (1st Cir. 1978); Connor v. Winter, 519 F. Supp. 1337, 1340
(S.D. Miss. 1981); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440; Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845,
847-48 (9th cir. 1980) (plaintiff who obtained preliminary injunction was "prevailing
party" under 42 U.S.C. 1988, even though action was subsequently dismissed as
moot), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th
Cir. 1980) (voluntary compliance mooted lawsuit); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (where there is voluntary compliance, the
lawsuit was "catalyst" which prompted defendant to comply and attorneys' fees will
be awarded).
70. United Handicapped Fed'n, 622 F.2d at 348; see also Besig v. Dolphin Boating &
Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982).
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achieves some benefit may be considered "prevailing."71
Courts have developed a two-part test to discern whether a litigant
is "prevailing" and therefore entitled to attorneys' fees in the con-
text of a settled or mooted dispute.72 The test, first enunciated in
Nadeau v. Helgemoe,73 has been adopted by the Eighth Circuit and
cited with approval by the Supreme Court. 74 A litigant must meet
both parts of the Nadeau test to qualify as a prevailing party for fee
shifting purposes. 75
The first part of the test is a question of fact requiring a determina-
tion of whether the plaintiff's lawsuit served as a catalyst which
prompted the opposing party to take remedial action. 76 The suit
must be "a necessary and important factor in achieving the relief
desired."77
The second part of the Nadeau test is a legal determination of rea-
sonableness. 78 A litigant may not be considered "prevailing" where
the suit was so frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless that the de-
fendant's voluntary compliance with the plaintiff's desired relief may
be considered gratuitous. 79
2. The Triad of Sections 2412, 1988 & 1983
It is the combination of sections 2412, 1988, and 1983 that form
the crucible of Premachandra. Section 2412(b) waives sovereign im-
munity and provides that the United States shall be liable for fees to
the same extent that any other party would be liable under fee shift-
ing statues.80 Section 1988, a fee shifting statute, awards fees to pre-
vailing parties of section 1983 suits.81 Section 1983, in turn,
imposes civil liability upon any party who, under color of state law,
deprives a citizen of his constitutional rights. 82 Thus, the United
States can be charged with attorneys' fees in an action to vindicate
71. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79).
72. Hensley, 461 F.2d 424; United Handicapped Fedn, 622 F.2d 342; Nadeau, 581
F.2d 275.
73. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
74. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; United Handicapped Fedn, 622 F.2d at 345-46.
75. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 721-22.
76. United Handicapped Fed'n, 622 F.2d at 346. It is not necessary for the lawsuit
to be the only cause or even the primary cause of the defendant's decision to settle.
Id.
77. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 721; Begis, 683 F.2d at 1278 (plaintiffmust establish
"clear, causal relationship" between lawsuit and voluntary action of defendant); see
also Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1226 (lawsuit was a "material factor" in plaintiff main-
taining her position with the Navy for purposes of § 2412).
78. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281.
79. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 722.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see supra note 49.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see supra note 51.
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constitutional rights to the same extent that any other party would be
liable.
Section 1983, however, only provides a cause of action for depri-
vation under color of state law.83 The federal government, by defini-
tion, seldom acts under color of state law. The dilemma here is
whether the United States can be charged with fees when it acts
under color of federal law rather than state law. Section 2412(b) im-
poses liability to the same extent that any other party would be lia-
ble. The question is whether Congress intended that the United
States should be substituted for the state itself without the need to
prove state action. If not, is it necessary for the United States to act
in concert with state officials in a way that would constitute a state
action in order to be liable for attorneys' fees.84
This triad of statutes was interpreted in the case of Lauritzen v. Leh-
man. 8 5 At issue in Lauritzen was whether section 2412(b) reaches vio-
lations of the Constitution where federal officals act under color of
federal law rather than state law.86 Laruitzen, threatened with dis-
charge from the Navy on the basis of homosexuality, alleged viola-
tion of her constitutional rights.87 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction enjoining the discharge pending a hearing
before the Board for the Correction of Naval Records (Board).8 8
After the Board reversed the personnel action, the district court
awarded attorneys' fees under section 2412(b).89 The court found
that the legislative history of section 2412(b) demonstrated congres-
sional intent to make the United States liable for fees in actions
analogous to section 1983 for vindiction of constitutional rights.90
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); see supra note 60.
84. Federal officials usually act under color of federal law and seldom deprive
constitutional rights under color of state law. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 729; cf.
Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th Cir. 1979) (imposing liability on fed-
eral officials under § 1983 only where state officials played a significant role in the
underlying constitutional violation), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)
(per curiam).
85. 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984) (Lehman was sued in his capacity as Secretary of
the Navy).
86. Id. at 553.
87. Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1223. Lauritzen sought damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief on the grounds that the Navy's past and threatened actions violated
her rights under the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth amendments to the Constitu-
tion. Id. The district court awarded fees because it found Laritzen's claim to be vir-
tually identical to an action under § 1983. Id. at 1227, 1229.
88. Id. A temporary restraining order was issued previously, pending a hearing
on the injunction to prevent Lauritzen's discharge from the Navy. Id.
89. Id. at 1229. The district court held that the United States was liable to the
same extent as any other party under § 1988. Id.
90. Id. at 1227-28. The court stated that "the EAJA was specifically amended to
provide for precisely the type of liability involved in this case." Id. see Clemente v.
United States, 568 F. Supp. 1150, 1170-71 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (adopting the reasoning
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The court reasoned that since a state official would be liable under
section 1988 for fees in a section 1983 action alleging constitutional
violations, the United States should be held liable to the same
extent. 91
Lauritzen was reversed on appeal.92 The Ninth Circuit held that
Laruitzen was not eligible for fees under section 2412(b) because the
violations she alleged did not meet the specific provisions enumer-
ated under the Act.93 Neither the legislative history nor the policy of
the EAJA persuaded the court to depart from a narrow reading of
section 2412(b).94 In examining section 2412(b) in its statutory
framework, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended subsec-
tion (d) to be the general statutory exception to sovereign immu-
nity.9 5 Finally, the court considered analogous actions to be without
boundaries or limitation, upsetting the balance of subsections (b)
and (d).96
II. THE PREMACHANDRA DECISION
A. Factual Background
Dr. Premachandra was a research endocrinologist employed by the
Veterans Administration (VA).97 Premachandra's underlying cause
of action arose out of the VA's termination of his employment and its
directive to dismantle his research laboratory.98 As an eighteen-year
of Lauritzen, awarding fees and costs to the plaintiff under 2412(b) in action for viola-
tion of fifth amendment due process rights); accord Muth v. Marsh, 525 F. Supp. 604,
609 (D.D.C. 1981) (United States liable for fees under § 2412(b) for violation of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act where Act provides that a litigant may recover
legal fees and costs from a non-government defendant).
91. Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1227.
92. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 550. The Ninth Circuit's review was de novo since the
appeal raised issues concerning the interpretation of the EAJA in awarding fees. Id.
at 553.
93. Id. at 553. For other courts that have agreed with the Ninth Circuit, see
Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1984); Unification Church v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., 574 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v.
Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. 122, 127-29 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
94. See Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 554-57.
95. Id. at 557-58. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration of
whether the actions of the United States' were substantially justified. Id. at 559. If
the United States was not substantially justified, Lauritzen would be permitted to
recover under § 2412(d). Id. Thus, to escape liability, the government must demon-
strate that its position was reasonable both in law and fact. The decision is to be
based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
96. Id. at 557. The court found that nearly every case alleging a constitutional or
statutory violation by the federal government could be characterized as analogous to
an imaginary § 1983 action. Id.
97. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 636.
98. Id. Premachandra's complaint stated claims based on the fifth amendment,
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career employee, he could only be dismissed for cause. 99 Moreover,
disassembly of the lab would have resulted in destruction of rare
blood samples and ongoing experiments representing years of
work.100 Premachandra alleged that the failure of the VA to provide
him with a pretermination hearing violated his due process rights as
guaranteed by the fifth amendment.' 01
Premachandra appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board (MSPB). He also sought an order enjoining the VA
from requiring him to dismantle his laboratory.102
The district court issued a temporary restraining order,103 but
subsequently denied Premachandra's motion for a preliminary in-
junction.104 The district court, the Eighth Circuit, and the United
States Supreme Court all denied Premachandra's application for an
injunction pending appeal.10 5
Premachandra submitted a second motion to the Eighth Circuit
requesting an order prohibiting the dismantling of his laboratory,
but allowing the VA to terminate his employment.106 The Eighth
Circuit granted a stay pending oral argument. 107 Subsequent to oral
argument, but prior to the court's decision, the VA voluntarily
agreed that the lab would remain intact until the MSPB hearing.108
The injunction issue became moot when the MSPB ordered the VA
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (1982), and VA regulations
implementing the 1978 Act. Id. at 637 n.1.
99. Premachandra, 509 F. Supp. at 425. Federal civil service employees have a
valid property interest in continued employment and can only be dismissed for
cause. Id. at 428-29.
100. Id. at 427. Approximately three years work was required to render the ten
room laboratory fully operational. Id. at 426. While it would be possible to freeze
the blood samples, the integrity of the experiments would be violated. Id. at 427.
101. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 636. Premachandra "claimed that his unique scien-
tific role at the VA placed him in an exceptional category of cases in which due pro-
cess demanded an evidentiary hearing prior to his termination." Brief for Appellee
at i, Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
102. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 719.
103. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 119.
104. Id. The injunction was denied because the court found Premachandra to
have only a minimal chance of success on the merits of his claim for a permanent
injunction. Premachandra, 509 F. Supp. at 430.
105. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 719.
106. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 119.
107. Id. The stay did not extend to the termination of the plaintiffs employment.
Id.
108. Id. at 119-20. In a letter to the court the VA agreed "not to dismantle or
interfere with appellant's use of the laboratory before the decision on the merits of
appellant's discharge is filed by the Hearing Examiner." Id. at 120. As a result of the
VA's voluntary restraint, the Eighth Circuit entered an order on May 21, 1981, in
which it recognized the VA's agreement not to dismantle the laboratory and ordered
a stay with regard to that issue pending appeal. Id. at 119. The VA subsequently
permitted Dr. Premachandra to work in his lab without pay. Id. at 120.
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to reverse Premachandra's termination.109 In addition, the MSPB
granted Premachandra's request for attorneys' fees in the adminis-
trative proceeding. I 10
B. District Court Posture
Upon dismissal of the case by the Eighth Circuit after the ruling of
the MSPB, Premachandra petitioned the district court for the recov-
ery of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the preliminary injunc-
tion litigation.ilI A threshold issue, whether Premachandra was a
prevailing party, was in dispute.1l2 Several courts had denied
Premachandra's first motion to enjoin his termination and the disas-
sembly of his laboratory.'13 On the other hand, a second motion
seeking only to prohibit the disassembly of the laboratory was before
the Eighth Cricuit when the VA voluntarily agreed to Comply.114
Both parties claimed to be "prevailing.",15 Several courts have
deemed a party to be prevailing when remedial action is taken by the
defendant after a suit has been initiated. 116
The district court, applying the two-part Nadeau test, concluded
that Premachandra was indeed a prevailing party.' '7 First, the law-
suit was found to be a catalyst to the VA's decision to allow Prema-
chandra to remain in his laboratory pending disposition.'18 The VA
had maintained that its voluntary compliance was merely a "gratui-
tous litigating courtesy."1 9 Secondly, the court found that the rea-
sonableness of the lawsuit was demonstrated by the MSPB's reversal
109. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 120. The MSPB concluded that if the VA had
made reasonable inquiry it would have know that the charges against Premachandra
were without merit. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 720 n.1.
110. The MSPB held that it did not have jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees in-
curred in connection with proceedings before the federal courts. Premachandra, 545
F. Supp. at 122.
111. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 720. Premachandra requested fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Id.
112. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 120. Premachandra must be a prevailing party
as the term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
114. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 119-20.
115. Id. at 120-21.
116. Id. at 121. See supra note 69.
117. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 121.
118. Id.; cf Harrington, 656 F.2d at 267 (where there is overlap between "voluntary
compliance" and a legal duty, a court may nonetheless interpret lawsuit as catalyst to
defendant's remedial action).
119. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 723. The VA characterized its compliance as a liti-
gating courtesy amounting to a minimal concession. Brief for Appellant at 11-12,
Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985). The court characterized this
argument as bordering on "self-serving hindsight which could be urged in every case
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of the VA's dismissal.120 Thus, since both parts of the test were posi-
tive, Premachandra was found to be a "prevailing party." 1 2 t
The district court interpreted section 2412(b) in conjunction with
section 1988, the fee shifting section of the Civil Rights Act.122 The
court found federal violations of constitutional rights to be analo-
gous to state violations embraced by section 1983.123 Further, the
court found that Congress intended to authorize fee awards in suits,
like Premachandra, where federal officials have violated fundamental
constitutional rights.124 Accordingly, the district court held that
Premachandra was entitled to attorneys' fees.125
On appeal, the fee award was upheld by a divided panel of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 2 6 The Eighth Circuit, recognizing
the importance of Premachandra, heard the case again en banc. 127
C. The Premachandra Decision
On rehearing, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion.12 8 The court framed the prime issue as being whether the
United States may be held liable for fee awards under section
2412(b) for constitutional violations.129 Contrary to the panel's
holding, the court, sitting en banc, found no authority to award attor-
neys' fees. 13o
The Premachandra court looked first to the ordinary meaning of
120. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 122.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 120-21. The Eighth Circuit panel explained the district court's reason-
ing. Section 2412 provides that the United States shall be liable for fees to the same
extent as any other prevailing party. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 723-24. Section 1988
authorizes fees against litigants other than the government where the plaintiff has
sued to enforce a provision enumerated in § 1983. Id. at 724. Section 1983 provides
a statutory right against any person who under color of state law, violates another's
constitutional rights. Id. Thus, § 1988 authorizes fees against state officials that vio-
late constitutional rights under color of state law. Id. The only difference in Prema-
chandra is that the federal officials act under color of federal law. Id.
123. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 120-21.
124. See id. District courts facing this issue have come to different conclusions. See
Unification Church, 574 F. Supp. at 95-96 (D.D.C. 1983) (fees not awarded without
state action); Venus, 556 F. Supp. at 520-21 (§ 1988 may only be invoked where state
action is present); Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 227 (legislative history supports award of
fees where federal offical violates Constitution); Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines,
541 F. Supp. at 127-28 (§ 1988 available only when state action is involved).
125. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 122.
126. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 717.
127. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 635.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 636.
130. Id. The Eighth Circuit found no basis in the language of the statutes or legis-
latiave history to support an award of attorneys' fees. See id. at 642.
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section 2412(b) to determine its legislative purpose.131 Section
2412(b) provides attorneys' fees "to the same extent that any other
party would be liable" under common law or fee shifting statutes.132
The court limited its review to section 1988, arguably the only appli-
cable fee shifting statute. 133 Moreover, section 1983 is the only stat-
ute within the purview of section 1988 that provides protection for
constitutional violations.134 Since the United States did not act
under color of state law as required by section 1983, the court found
that the fee shifting statute did not apply.13 5 Although the court
swiftly disposed of the section 1983 liability, it proceeded to address
the uncertainty presented by section 2412(b).136
Second, acknowledging that section 2412(b) may be ambiguous,
the Eighth Circuit examined its context under the EAJA for clarifica-
tion.l37 Section 2412(d), a companion fee shifting subsection, essen-
tially provides attorneys' fees unless the United States was
substantially justified or unless other special circumstances make the
award of fees unjust. 138 The Eighth Circuit in Premachandra reasoned
that if section 2412(b) were read without a state action requirement,
the federal government would be liable for fees under section
2412(b) without regard to the substantially justified standard of sec-
tion 2412(d).139 The court found that Congress could not have in-
tended that section 2412(b) swallow section 2412(d) and accordingly
131. Id. at 637. The court believed that the ordinary meaning of the language of
the statute expressed the legislative purpose. Id. at 639.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Eighth Circuit examined only § 2412(b) because
§ 2412(d) was not properly raised in the district court. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at
641-42.
133. See Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 637. The common law principles codified in
§ 2412(b) were raised in district court, but they were not decided. Id. at 642. Thus,
the Eight Circuit remanded Premachandra for a determination of whether the govern-
ment was liable under common law principles. Id.
134. Id. at 637.
135. Id.; accord Blum, 643 F.2d at 83 & n.17.
136. See Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 638.
137. Id. at 639; accord Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); C. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 27.0, at 457 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1985 Revi-
sion); cf. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm'n, 420 U.S. 395, 403
(1975) (section 4(e) of Federal Power Act must be interpreted in context of other
provisions of the Act).
138. For the complete text of § 2412(d)(l)(A), see supra note 61.
139. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 638. "Premachandra's interpretation of § 2412(b)
would render nugatory the 'substantially justified' and 'special circumstances' limits
in § 2412(d)." Id. Notably, § 1983 extends not only to violation of constitutional
rights but also to those created by a broad range of federal statutes. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). As one court stated, "[i]f the state action component
of § 1983 were elimiated for purposes of § 2412(b) fee awards, that subsection would
effectively swallow up Section 2412(d). In light of the far more liberal standard for
allowance of fees under § 1988, that would be an extraordinary result not lightly to
be imputed to Congress." Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. at 125.
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held that such a result should be avoided.140
Third, the court turned to Premachandra's prime argument, that
legislative history evidences Congressional intent to charge the
United States with fees in actions analogous those brought against
state parties under section 1983.14, As proposed, section 2412(b)
would have imposed fees on the United States only to the extent that
a private party would be liable. 142 A witness, Armond Derfner, testi-
fying before the House committee expressly noted the discrepancy
between a state's liability for fees in section 1983 actions and the
federal government's liability in virtually identical fact patterns. 143
Derfner suggested a change in the wording of section 2412(b) which
would put the United States completely on par with state govern-
ments. 144 In the immediately succeeding draft, the language was
amended to impose fees on the United States to the same extent as
"any other party."'45
140. See Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 638. The VA argued that if § 2412(b) were
stretched to permit federal officials acting under color of federal law, "fee requests in
many statutory actions in the areas of food stamps, housing, Medicaid, and other
public benefit programs will also be channeled through § 2412(b)." Supplemental
Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
Premachandra's response is that the existing limitations on § 1983 actions will
prevent most parties from invoking the analogous link to § 1988. Premachandra, 753
F.2d at 638. Section 1983 does not apply to every violation of a federal statute. See,
e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
20-21 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
141. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 639.
142. Award of Attorney's Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on s. 265 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Judiciary
Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1, 3, 9 (1980) (cited in Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 639).
143. Armond Derfner testified before the House subcommittee:
There is an area in which a slight drafting modification could carry out
what I believe might be the intention of the committee; and that is to put the
United States completely on a par as far as the enforcement of important
constitutional and statutory rights.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1976 you provided that when someone,
whether it be an individual or business, or whatever sues a State or local
government under 42 United States Code, section 1983, to vindicate a con-
stitutional or Federal statutory rights [sic], that fees would be available
under the Newman v. Peggy [Piggie] [sic] Park standard. These bills say that
the United States should pay fees-in the amendment to 28 United States
Code 2412-in those circumstances where the court may award such fees in
suits involving private parties.
That doesn't say State or local government, but if the language were
amended to read, "in those circumstances where the court may award such
fees in suits involving other litigants"; it would achieve that purpose. And
I think it would go even further toward putting the United States on a par
with other governmental bodies.
Id.
144. Id.
145. SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE
OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1, 4, 7,
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Premachandra argued that the only plausible explanation for the
amendment was an intent to implement Derfner's suggestion that
the federal government should be on equal footing with state gov-
ernments. 146 The Eighth Circuit, however, found the plain meaning
of section 2412(b) to obviate the need to resort to "conjecture" re-
garding legislative history.14 7 The court was reluctant to give dis-
positive weight to Derfner's testimony, particularly since there were
no statements linking the testimony to the amendment.14 8 In addi-
tion, the court noted that while Derfner suggested the language be
changed to "other litigants" the actual change was to "any other
party."' 49
Finally, while denying a mission to protect the treasury, the Eighth
Circuit noted that uncertainty must be resolved in the government's
favor.150 The EAJA is a waiver of sovereign immunity and must be
strictly construed to the advantage of the United States.' 5' The
court held that Congress had not made the United States clearly lia-
ble for fees in actions for constitutional deprivation.15 2
19-20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4985-86; Lauritzen, 546
F. Supp. at 1228.
146. This interpretation was found persuasive by the district court. Premachandra,
727 F.2d at 728-29; see also, Lauritzen, 736 F.2d 550; Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1228
(such an interpretation comports with the policies underlying the enactment of
EAJA); Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. at 129 n.6 (there is no other
explanation than that proposed by plaintiff).
On the other hand, the VA maintained that the issue is not what Derfner in-
tended, but what Congress intended. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Federal Ap-
pellants on Rehearing En Banc at 12, Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir.
1985).
147. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 639. The court finds the origin of the amendment
ambiguous and insufficient to contradict the express language of the statute. Id. at
641.
148. Id. at 640. The court notes that there is convincing authority that the ab-
sence of discussion between Derfner's testimony and the implementation of the
amendment should not be taken as agreement. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, 181-82 (1975) ("There could hardly be less rep-
utable legislative material than legislative silence."); see also American Smelting &
Refining Co. v. OSHA, 501 F.2d 504, 510 (8th Cir. 1974) (Congressional failure to
respond to comments in a committee hearing does not necessarily reflect
agreement).
149. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 640.
150. Id. at 641. The court does not sit as the self-constituted guardian of the
Treasury. Id.; see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).
151. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 641. The Eighth Circuit has held that with respect
to the EAJA, the conditions upon which the government consents to be sued must be
strictly construed and that exceptions may not be implied. Monark Boat Co., 708 F.2d
at 1329.
152. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 641. A concise amendment could have accom-
plished the purpose and failure to do so casts doubt on whether it was intended. Id.
The Eighth Circuit remanded the case for decision on whether Premachandra
was entitled to attorneys' fees under a common law exception to the American Rule.
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III. DISCUSSION
In Premachandra, the Eighth Circuit resorted to an unduly literal
translation of section 2412(b) that serves to eviscerate the clear in-
tent of Congress.' 53 Legislative history indicates that the Derfner
amendment was intended to award fees to litigants in Premachan-
dra's position. The primary objective of statutory construction is to
determine the underlying legislative intent.154 When federal statutes
are facially ambiguous, it is clearly proper to examine legislative his-
tory to discern congressional intent.155 Testimony before a legisla-
tive committee is evidence of congressional intent when it is acted
upon. 15
6
The Eighth Circuit, however, placed minimal significance on legis-
lative history by making reference to the "ashcans of the legislative
process."1 5 7  Consequently, the Eighth Circuit thus devalued
Derfner's testimony.158 Section 2412(b) was amended in substantial
Id. at 642. The case was subsequently settled. Telephone interview with Marilyn S.
Teitelbaum, attorney for appellee (Sept. 18, 1985).
153. Cf Barnes v. Donovan, 720 F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (parties may not
resort to an unduly literal translation that ignores Congressional intent).
154. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 293 (1907). Such in-
tent is to be found in the language of the statute itself. When the language is ambig-
uous or the meaning is doubtful, the court should consider the purpose, the subject
matter and the condition of affairs which led to its enactment, and so construe it to
effectuate and not destroy the spirit and force of the law and not to render it absurd.
Id.; see, Lambur, 148 F.2d at 139; see also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600,
609 (1941).
155. Lambur, 148 F.2d at 139. That other circuits are at odds with the interpreta-
tion of section 2412(b) is ample evidence that the statute is ambiguous. See Boudin v.
Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984); Clemente v. United States, 568 F.
Supp. 1150, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Hollbrook v. Pitt, 748 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th
Cir. 1984); Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 553-59; Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 673 (7th
Cir. 1984); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp.
921 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Trujillo v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (D. Colo. 1984);
Unification Church, 574 F. Supp. at 95-96; Venus, 556 F. Supp. 514; Miscellaneous Porno-
graphic Magazines, 521 F. Supp. at 126-27.
156. Testimony before a congressional committee is sometimes dispositive in in-
terpreting congressional intent where the witness is closely associated wth the legisla-
tion. United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 72 n.14 (1952) (citing congressional
testimony of the Assistant Administrator for Insurance, Veterans Administration, to
interpret statute); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
547-48 (1940) (testimony of Chairman of Legislative Committee of the Interstate
Commerce Commission); 2A C. SANDS, supra note 137, § 49.11 (statements of indi-
vidual witnesses considered where they sponsored legislation or led it through Con-
gress). But see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979) (statement by
sponsor not dispositive); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493
(1931); March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. Kung Chen Fur Corp., 188 F.2d 577, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
157. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 638. Rather, the court looks to the context of
the EAJA as a more formal expression of Congressional intent. Id.
158. See id. at 638-39.
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accordance with Derfner's testimony.159 It is mischaracterization to
say that Congress was silent on the connection between Derfner's
testimony and the amendment.' 60 It is the sequence of events that
provides the nexus between the testimony and the intent of Con-
gress to implement the proposed change.161 Derfner proposed an
amendment to make the United States liable for fee awards in actions
analogous to section 1983.162 Following Derfner's suggestions,
Congress amended section 2412(b).163 Derfner's testimony is the
only possible impetus for the amendment.164
The court's fear that an expansive reading of section 2412(b) will
swallow section 2412(d) is unwarranted. The two subsections have
different and distinct goals.16 5 Section 2412(b)/1983 actions are
only available for a limited number of enumerated statutory viola-
tions. 16 6 Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for violations
of rights akin to fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
6 7
In contrast, section 2412(d) was a catchall provision, encompass-
ing situations not covered by section 2412(b).168 Although there is
some overlap, section 2412(d) embraces suits where similarly situ-
ated private individuals or state governments would not be liable.169
Some amount of overlap is not surprising because section 2412(d)
was enacted for a limited period of time as an experimental provi-
159. Premachandra 753 F.2d at 643 (F. Gibson,J., dissenting); Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at
561 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
160. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 643-44 (F. Gibson,J., dissenting). If Derfner's pro-
posal had not been the intent of the Committee, then in that circumstance one would
expect additional comments and debate. See id. at 643. No debate occurred because
the Committee was in agreement with Derfner as shown by the amendment. See id.
161. See Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 561 (Boochever, J., dissenting). The court in Miscel-
laneous Magazines acknowledges that this may be the case but suggests that Derfner
"was a better policy advocate than a draftsman." Misc. Magazines, 541 F. Supp. at
129.
162. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
163. Lauritzen, 546 F. supp. at 1228.
164. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 562 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 563.
166. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 730 (§ 2412/1983 cause of action does not encom-
pass violations of all federal statutes).
167. First Nat'l Bank ofOmaha, 636 F.2d at 199 (holding that violation of plaintiff's
bank's rights under the National Banking Act did not give rise to a § 1983 action).
168. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 18; reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD NEWS 4984, 4997 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1418]. Section
2412(d) is intended to apply only where fee awards against the government are not
already authorized. Additionally, section 2412(d) was designed primarily to en-
courage small businesses to contest the unreasonable exercise of federal agency ac-
tion. See id. at 9-10; 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4988.
169. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 730.
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sion. 170 Finally, the House Report indicates that Congress intended
the more specific fee shifting provision, section 2412(b), to super-
sede section 2412(d) where the two provisions conflict.171
The Eighth Circuit avoided an interpretation of section 2412(b)
that would expand federal liability for fee awards without restrictions
and limitations.172 Both sections 2412(b) and 2412(d), however,
have sufficient discretionary safeguards which allow a court to reduce
or deny awards to prevent anticipated abuse.17 3 Although courts
may have limited discretion to award fees under section 2412(b), it
remains a discretionary provision.174 On the other hand, though
section 2412(d) is a mandatory provision, the court may determine
that the government is substantially justified or that special circum-
stances make the award unjust.
17 5
In enacting the EAJA, Congress intended to put the United States
on equal footing with other litigants.176 Section 2412(b) provides
that the United States has the same liability as any other party. If a
state official had violated Premachandra's constitutional rights, the
state would be liable for attorneys' fees under section 1988.177 It
follows that the United States should be charged with attorneys' fees
for a violation of similar rights. 17 8 This is entirely consistent with the
legislative history and the policy it was designed to implement.
In legislation passed to re-enact section 2412(d), Congress noted
that section 2412(b) grants discretion to award fees against the
United States to the same extent that state governments would be
170. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. at 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 4992. A sunset provision repealed 2412(d) on October 1,
1984. Id. Although section 2412(d) was reenacted by Congress (H.R. 5479), Presi-
dent Reagan has declined to sign it into law. See supra note 63.
171. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4997 (section 2412(d) is intended to apply only to cases
where fee awards against the government are not already authorized).
172. See Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 638.
173. Note, supra note 1, at 726.
174. Courts may have limited discretion to deny analogous awards under § 1988.
See, e.g., Sethy v. Almeda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979)
(awards are unavailable where special circumstances render the award unjust), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980). Attorneys' fees, however, are not always awarded under
§ 1988. See, e.g., Greenside v. Ariyoshi, 526 F. Supp. 1194, 1197 (D. Hawaii 1981)
(award of attorneys' fees in civil rights action must not encourage the overpressing of
marginal claims).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). In addition, section 2412(d) permits the court, in its
discretion, to reduce or deny an award to a party "engaged in conduct which unduly
and unreasonably protracted the final resolution .. " Id. § 2412(d)(1)(C).
176. H.R. REP No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 4987.
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liable.179 The House Report specifically indicates approval of the
district court's fee award to Premachandra. The Report cites the dis-
trict court's interpretation as an example of how section 2412(b) is
intended to work.180 While not dispositive, the House Report is yet
another indication of legislative intent.
Although the Eighth Circuit expressly denies a mission to protect
the public fisc, the court betrays its parental anxiety.181 In the mar-
gin, the court notes that many of the currently "disappointed liti-
gants" would be awarded fees absent a standard to limit the United
States' liability. It should not be forgotten that these litigants are
disappointed because they have been violated by federal officials.
Many of these victims do not have the resources to vindicate their
rights. The court should not protect the economics of government
at the expense of important societal rights.
Public confidence in our governmental process fosters voluntary
compliance with the laws. Respect for the law is contingent upon fair
and uniform application of the law to the government and the popu-
lace alike. Denying a prevailing party his attorneys' fees insulates the
government from responsibility for its actions. Moreover, private
enforcement of rights is a necessary element of our legal system.' 82
Indigent parties who need protection most lack the economic
strength to oppose unreasonable government action. The expense
179. H.R. REP. No. 992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) which accompanied H.R.
5479 supports the panel's decision on Premachandra.
In a permanent provision of the Act which is unaffected by H.R. 5479 -
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) - a court is given discretion to award reasonable attor-
neys' fees and other costs in addition to those costs enumerated in section
2412(a) against the United States to the same extent that any other party-
i.e., private, public, or governmental-may be liable under the common law
or under terms of any statue which specifically provides for such an award.
See, Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984). The provisions [sic]
was designed to put the United States in the same position as other parties.
Id. at 4, n.3.
But cf Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
117 (1980) ("the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one") (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313
(1960)); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1977) ("[such] observations
.. are in no sense part of the legislative history") (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1979)).
180. H.R. REP. No. 992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at -.
181. See Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 638 n.2 (1985). The footnote reads:
Experience has demonstrated the limiting influence of the "substan-
tially justified" language [of § 2412(d)]. During the 1983 fiscal year, 133 fee
requests were filed under subsection (d). Over half of these petitions were
denied on the ground that the government's position was substantially justi-
fied. 1983 Annual Report Administrative Office United States Courts 82. If
allowed to proceed under subsection (b). many of these disappointed litigants may have
been awarded fees. (emphasis added).
Id.
182. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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of litigation should not be a barrier to the enjoyment of fundamental
rights.
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit construed section 2412(b) restrictively because
its scope is facially uncertain. The issue, however, is not whether
section 2412(b) was drafted with precision. At issue is congressional
intent. The record clearly demonstrates congressional intent to
charge the United States with attorneys' fees in actions analogous to
those brought against state officials for constitutional deprivation.183
Premachandra undercuts the intent of Congress and thus impinges
challenges of unreasonable government actions.184
The EAJA created the perception that the average citizen could
challenge unfair government action. The EAJA was intended to en-
courage individuals to vigorously vindicate their rights by minimiz-
ing the disparity of economic resources between private litigants and
the federal government. The court should not import immunities
back into a statute designed to limit them.I8 5 If the Premachandra
court's interpretation of section 2412(b) prevails, victims remain vul-
nerable and defenseless in the government's shadow. Governmental
deprivation of constitutional rights will continue unchecked. It is
hoped that Congress will take appropriate steps to give the courts a
clearer directive.
Mark J. Frenz
183. Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1228.
184. Cardozo, J., in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147,
153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926) wrote: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves
hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by
refinement of construction, where consent has been announced."
185. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 69.
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